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2Recent Developments in Employment Relations in the Philippines
Abstract
We seek to describe recent developments in employment relations in the Philippines, placing these 
developments in the contexts of the distinctive elements of the Philippine social/political/industrial relations 
systems as well as the ongoing trade-based and functional integration of international markets and the recent 
regional economic crisis. We find that, while some firms are pursuing functional flexibility and more 
cooperative employment relations, the logic of competition has primarily induced firms to adopt practices 
that promote numerical flexibility such that a core-periphery workforce is created.  We argue that the labor 
movement in the Philippines has been hampered in its efforts to effectively counter employer strategies by 
its low density, its fragmentation, and an unfavorable public policy environment; Philippine labor unions 
have, however, made some recent gains in organizing and inter-union coordination. We also argue that 
governments, both national and regional, have not done enough to counteract the negative effects of market 
integration on workers nor to evolve the Philippines into a higher value-added exporter. 
3In this paper, we seek to describe recent developments in employment relations in 
the Philippines.  We place these developments in the context of the distinctive elements 
of the Philippine social/political/industrial relations systems: Spanish and U.S. colonial 
histories, a labor law structure that closely corresponds to the NLRA in the United States, 
arguably the most actively militant and independent labor movement in Southeast Asia, 
and a democratic political system in the post-Marcos era. 
We also place the employment relations developments in the context of the 
ongoing trade-based and functional integration of international markets and the recent 
regional economic crisis, factors that have impacted the Philippines to a great extent, 
given that it is one of the more open economies in Southeast Asia.  
We argue that the sharpening of the competitive environment as a function of 
greater internationalization of markets has negatively affected the workforce in the 
Philippines.  The primary evidence cited in support of this proposition includes the 
growing percentage of workers who are leaving formal sector employment for the 
informal sector through subcontracting and casualization, and stagnation in real wages 
despite overall economic growth. 
We examine employment relations practices in a number of key industries and 
firms with the objective of understanding the mechanisms by which these effects of 
economic integration are generated (summarizing the findings from Kuruvilla, Erickson, 
Anner, Amante, and Ortiz 2000). We will take a detailed look at how employment 
relations are changing and attempt to understand why they are changing. We will also 
look at institutions in the labor market that traditionally work to protect workers 
4(government policy and trade unions), and examine why these institutions have worked or 
not worked. 
We find that, while some firms are pursuing functional flexibility and more 
cooperative employment relations1, the logic of competition has primarily induced firms 
to adopt practices that promote numerical flexibility: cut labor, restructure their business, 
and subcontract such that a core-periphery workforce is created; otherwise cut labor costs; 
and pursue anti-union policies. The imperative to restructure the activities of firms has 
come from a number of directions, notably increasing competition from neighboring 
countries, the ratification of various international standards and conventions, and the 
lower productivity in some sectors relative to other ASEAN countries, coupled with the 
gradual erosion in the competitive advantage coming from lower labor costs.  One of the 
most pervasive forms of numerical flexibility is labor contracting, the prevalence of 
which has grown in recent years despite being formally illegal.2  In addition, the regional 
financial crisis in Asia has only accelerated these trends (see Erickson and Kuruvilla 
2000; Esguerra et al. 1999; Legardo and Ortiz 2000).   
We argue that the labor movement in the Philippines has been hampered in its 
efforts to effectively counter employer strategies by its low density, its fragmentation, and 
an unfavorable public policy environment; Philippine labor unions have, however, made 
some recent gains in organizing and inter-union coordination.  We argue that 
governments, both national and regional, have acted based on the logic of competition, 
1
 For example, changes in work organization and the work process, investments in training and skills 
development, flexible pay, and enhancing worker involvement in production decisions.
2
 The non-permissible hiring of workers through agencies is popularly called “labor-only contracting”, 
which is defined as follows: When a subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment in the 
form of machinery or equipment, but recruits  workers  in the name of the  subcontractor to do work that is 
5with little regard to other logics, such as employment protection or income protection, 
and that government has not done enough to evolve the Philippines into a higher value-
added exporter (both through infrastructural development policy as well as skills 
development policy).  
Thus, we argue that internationalization of markets has had a negative impact on 
employment relations and workers in the Philippines due to several interrelated factors: 
the limitations of the trade unions, the inability of regulatory institutions to enforce the 
law, the pervasiveness of the logic of free trade competition among people in positions of 
authority, and perhaps most importantly, the absence of political will to make policy and 
enforcement changes top-down to counteract the deleterious effects of economic 
integration.
In the next sections, we briefly review the historical and economic background 
and provide basic information on the industrial relations actors and climate.  We pay 
particular attention to the evidence indicating that the Philippines, and Filipino workers 
(as a class) and unions in particular, have not benefited much under the export-oriented 
industrialization regime in place since the early 1970s. We then move to a discussion of 
the findings from our case studies regarding the two most significant recent trends in
employment relations: toward functional flexibility in a few firms, and toward numerical 
flexibility in many others. Finally, we discuss the role of industrial relations and 
government institutions, and how they have mediated (or not) the impact of the 
employment relations changes on workers.  
directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually 
6RECENT HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The Philippines endured two different colonial periods, the Spanish period from 
the time of Magellan through 1898, and the American period through the first four 
decades of the 20th century.  The beginnings of a formally defined industrial relations 
system emerged in the mid-1930s, after the country gained commonwealth status within 
the framework of U.S. colonial rule.  A key early part of the system was the establishment 
of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), which was mandated to compulsorily hear both 
industrial and agrarian disputes.
Following the Japanese occupation during World War II, the Philippines gained 
independence. Table 1 provides GNP and GDP growth rates for the various stages of 
Philippines development since World War II and Table 2 provides unemployment rates, 
labor costs, and wages since 1970. 
-- INSERT TABLES 1 & 2 HERE –
Economic growth was high in the immediate post-war period, due to the extensive 
rebuilding after the war (Manila was considered the second-most damaged capital after 
Warsaw).  This was a period of import-substitution industrialization: import and foreign 
exchange controls were instituted, and industries imported semi-finished products and 
industrial parts for local assembly and distribution. There was also a rise in industrial 
disputes during the immediate post-war period; to deal with these disputes, the state 
passed the cornerstone of Philippine industrial relations legislation, the Industrial Peace 
employed.
7Act of 1953, based largely on the NLRA in the United States, and designed to promote 
bilateral collective bargaining. 
A balance of payments crisis emerged in the late 1950s, which was addressed by 
applying an IMF stabilization program for the first time: currency devaluation, export 
orientation, and removal of import and foreign exchange controls.  But, a high tariff 
system was also instituted.  In the early 1960s, the Philippines was widely considered to 
be the second-most developed country in Asia, after Japan.  And, while not spectacular, 
growth continued through the 1960s (Table 1).
The export-oriented industrialization strategy intensified in the 1970s.  This 
strategy, which was heavily influenced by World Bank structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs), sought to capitalize on the low wage advantage of the Philippines. However, this 
strategy was never fully implemented during the Marcos era (in part due to the crony 
capitalism issue, where Marcos business associates managed to secure various exceptions 
from full-fledged export-oriented industrialization). The exposure of the Philippines to 
the international economic order in the 1970s was also coincidental with increased 
indebtedness, the steady erosion in the value of the currency, declining real incomes, and 
a detrimental political environment.  The declaration of martial law in 1972 under 
President Marcos was also accompanied by several repressive policies in the industrial 
relations domain, such as the banning of strikes, restrictions in the exercise of   civil and 
labor rights, re-assertion of government authority over all disputes through the creation of 
the National Labor Relations Commission, neglect in improving  labor standards, and a 
restructuring of the fragmented union movement along industrial lines, with all unions 
8required to be affiliated with the government-controlled Trade Union Congress (see 
Villegas 1988 for a detailed description of this period)
Thus, it was only after the Marcos era, under the tenure of Presidents Aquino and 
Ramos, that a more full-scale implementation of export-oriented industrialization was 
begun through the framework of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Policies, 
reinforced by the enhanced structural adjustment facility loans from the International 
Monetary Fund.  
Overall, the shift to export-orientation was associated with a decline in labor 
power and voice, and an increase in employer power in an era where the Philippines’ 
competitive advantage was low wages and an English speaking workforce. The industrial 
relations regime focused on the pursuance of lower wages and workplace flexibility.  In 
the Philippine context, this invariably translated into efforts at increasing subcontracting, 
outsourcing, and union avoidance policies under an authoritarian regime.  
Although the more restrictive aspects of the martial law regime were lifted with 
the return to democracy after 1986, Philippine industrial relations policy has maintained a 
low-wage focus.  While there have been changes in labor legislation and recognition of 
labor rights, the fundamental character of both competitiveness as well as labor relations 
has remained unchanged, and in fact has tended towards the direction of further increases 
in employer efforts to generate numerical flexibility.  
The Philippines remains an export-oriented economy whose basic comparative 
advantage is still low wages (see Table 2 above; Ofreneo 1994 and Kuruvilla 1996).    It 
is still a location for labor-intensive investment given the other advantages of the 
Philippines workforce, notably its adaptability, education levels,  and its facility with the 
9English language. Notable in this respect is the sustained expansion of the electronics 
industry, mainly in the following areas: assembly work, parts manufacturing and data 
encoding.   The country is also a major site for the manufacture of auto parts such as wire 
harness, transmission, etc.
But unlike Malaysia which has made a definite transition to a more advanced 
stage of export-oriented industrialization, the Philippines is still located at an earlier stage 
even as it is already losing out to Asian competitors in some of these lower-cost 
industries.  This partly explains the continuing industrial and economic crisis in the 
Philippines.3  We will return to these issues below in our discussion of the role of 
government policy.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTORS, THE STRUCTURE OF THE LABOR 
FORCE, AND THE OVERALL IR CLIMATE
1. Labor and Employer Associations 
We focus here primarily on providing a picture of the Philippine trade unions. 
Estimating the strength of the labor movement and union density in the Philippines is 
problematic.   First, the economy is highly uneven: wage or salaried workers constitute 
roughly 50 per cent of the employed work force, or about 13.7 million as of April l998.  
3 Note, however, that this mechanistic view of export-oriented industrialization covers a complex range of
investment and exports in the Philippines. There are many industries and firms that have deepened their 
investment in manufacturing to produce more higher quality, more skill intensive, value-added products, 
(e.g., both the electronics and garment industries are more skill-intensive now than previously). Yet, the 
majority of firms continue to capitalize on the low wage aspect, given the fact that this is the aspect that 
management has relative control over (compared to other costs of business such as power rates, shipping 
costs, etc.).
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The rest are either self-employed or unpaid family workers, mostly in the informal sector 
or in the rural areas.
Out of the 13.7 million wage workers, about two million are in the government 
service, where unionism is relatively weak.  And then, out of the 11.7 million private 
sector employees as of April l998, about half are in micro enterprises, employing ten or 
fewer workers.   Unionism in these enterprises is impractical for obvious reasons of size 
and the highly paternalistic employment relations existing in such enterprises.
Thus, it is surprising to note that Philippine labor statistics indicate a total union 
membership of about 3.5 million (see Table 3).  If the organizable work force is around 6 
million, this membership figure gives the Philippines one of the highest union density  
rates in the world.   However, the membership figure given by the Department of Labor is 
based on “membership claims” submitted by the various federations and unions, which 
tend to exaggerate their respective membership bases.  This loose procedure of recording 
union membership means that a dozen competing federations can count as their members 
the same work force in a given  company.
-- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE –
 A more realistic assessment of the union strength is through the number of  
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and the number of workers covered by these 
CBAs.   With this approach, the picture changes radically.    In 1997, roughly 524,000 
workers were covered by 3003 collective bargaining agreements.   However, the number 
of effectively organized workers is certainly higher than the 524,000 figure as at any  
11
given time, there are workers in any of the following situations:  in the process of 
registering their unions, negotiating an agreement, or waiting for the outcome of a legal 
case on union recognition or CBA negotiation.  There are also those in the process 
organizing and cases where the parties did not bother to formally register their CBAs.   
Overall, the estimate of the research team is that there cannot be more than a million 
unionized workers out of a total organizable work force of about 6 million in the private 
sector.   
However, as in many Asian countries, there is also a great deal of fragmentation 
and rivalry among the unions and the federations.    As of 1997, there were 8822 labor 
unions divided into 174 federations, who are then affiliated to 9 to 10 competing labor 
centers.  The largest union federation, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines 
(TUCP) was formed during the martial law period.  The second largest union federation, 
and the TUCP’s main left-wing rival, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), was formed in 
1980 and received de facto legal recognition in 1986 with the end of the Marcos regime.  
There are also other smaller federations across the range of the political spectrum.  
On major labor and industrial relations policy issues, the employers are generally  
represented by the Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP), which works 
closely with the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), the Philippine 
Exporters Confederation (Philexport), the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Inc. (FFCCCII), and the various foreign  chambers of commerce 
and industry associations.  At the industry or plant-level, ECOP works either in tandem or 
separately with the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). These 
12
organizations have, by and large, been successful in influencing the direction of labor 
policies.   But, they are not organizations directly involved in collective negotiations, and 
they are dominated by some of the big foreign and local companies.4
2. The Structure of the Philippines Labor Force. 
Table 4 shows the basic structure of the Philippines labor force and Table 5 presents 
sectoral employment shares for selected Asian countries.   As the tables suggest, much of 
the workforce is engaged in services and agriculture. While the economic development 
strategy is predicated on attracting foreign direct investment in manufacturing for exports 
(see above), the share of manufacturing in terms of employment has not increased 
appreciably in recent years, and the share in “industry” is now below many other Asian 
nations (Table 5).  In the early l960s, the share of manufacturing in total employment was 
already around 10-12 per cent.  Today, it is not much higher.   
-- INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 HERE –
With  agriculture shrinking through the decades (from over 60 per cent share in 
employment in the early l960s to less than 40 per cent today), what seems to be really 
expanding by leaps and bounds is the service sector, which is now the biggest source of 
employment in the country.
4
 ECOP is composed of 600 corporations and 56 industry associations and chambers of commerce.  
Philexport has more than 2000 members which are majority small-to-medium enterprises.  PCCI has more 
than 100,000 direct and indirect members. 
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How can a nation with a stagnant or sluggish industrial sector and a declining 
agricultural sector sustain expansion in the service sector?  In the case of the Philippines, 
in two ways.  First,  the country’s economy relies heavily on remittances by overseas 
Filipino workers (OFWs) and Filipino immigrants in North America and other countries.    
In l995, a special commission  (Gangayco Commission) created to inquire into the 
situation of OFWs estimated the number of overseas Filipinos working in over 120 
countries to be around five (5) million.   Assuming that each OFW supports 4-5 Filipinos 
at home, the total population dependent on OFWs could easily be 20-25 million.  The 
OFW phenomenon explains why the Philippines has more money changing offices than 
bank branches and its malls are full on any given weekend with  families of OFWs.
The other source of expansion is the informal sector, which is the catch basin for 
those unable to find jobs in the relatively small formal sector of the economy or in the 
overseas labor market.   Unfortunately, there are few reliable statistics on the informal 
sector.   A survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics in 19925
estimated the number of casual and contractual workers in establishments of 10 workers or 
more at roughly 10 percent of the workforce, or 250,000.  The National Capital region 
accounts for 176,000 contractual workers. The only data that were available was for 1990, 
however, and that is reproduced in Table 6. 
-- INSERT TABLE 6 HERE –
5
 Ofreneo and Fernando (1993).
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Although it is difficult to get accurate estimates regarding subcontracting, clearly it is also
pervasive in the economy, as Table 7 indicates.
-- INSERT TABLE 7 HERE –
Finally, Philippine unemployment has been relatively high by Asian standards.   
The 13.3 per cent unemployment in April l998 was second only to Indonesia.  The latest 
unemployment figure, 11.4 per cent as of January 2001, is still higher than most countries  
in East and Southeast Asia.
3. The Overall IR Climate
The defining characteristic of Filipino industrial  relations is the adversarial nature 
of labor-management relations. The adversarial nature is rooted in an exceptionally 
legalistic approach that permeates every institution in the industrial relations system, in 
particular, dispute settlement. The tendency to rely on litigation and third party dispute 
resolution is dominant, with relatively fewer examples of bilateral problem solving. The 
existing institutional framework further deeply entrenches the adversarial nature of 
industrial relations with its reliance on U.S.-style legislation regarding union formation 
and dispute settlement. The focus is  on procedural issues rather than substance. 
The key question of why legalism exists needs to be answered before any attempt 
at policy reform. Historically, compulsory arbitration was the cornerstone of the IR 
system. Since the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given comprehensive powers to 
15
handle all industrial relations (and agrarian) cases in 1936, and settle them compulsorily 
on behalf of the state, industrial relations resolution was handled like any other court 
case. This policy thus required lawyers and that is the first and primary cause of legalism 
in the system. 
After the 1953 Industrial Peace Act, lawyers, who were entrenched in labor 
relations, took the lead role in the bargaining process, reducing in the process bargaining 
to a question of law rather than a question of negotiation. This legalistic tendency in 
collective bargaining was reinforced by the continuing central role of the CIR in dispute 
settlement, including the settlement of  issues involving unionized companies such as 
union recognition, collective bargaining deadlocks, unfair labor practices and strikes and 
lockouts.   Eventually, cases not settled at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Labor 
(in national interest disputes) and CIR were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court for judicial review. 
  In l974,   the CIR was replaced by the National Labor Relations Commission, or 
NLRC, pursuant to the industrial relations policy of the martial-law government of 
“promoting collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory arbitration”.   The 
legalistic  character of the system  has not changed with the creation of the NLRC, even if 
the latter has been dubbed as a quasi-judicial body and has been tasked to settle disputes 
in a non-technical and non-litigious manner.  Today, there is a huge body of labor 
jurisprudence built around various decisions issued by the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Appeals which guide labor law practitioners in the Philippines and which easily 
intimidate union officers and human resource managers who are non-lawyers. 
16
Efforts to change the amount of legalism in industrial relations in the 1980s 
through the creation of the National Conciliation and mediation Board (NCMB) and the 
encouragement of private voluntary arbitration was an important signal that the 
government had tired of the legalistic nature of industrial relations. In 1993, a 
comprehensive review of the labor code was undertaken with a view to changing 
industrial relations legislation to promote collaborative labor management relations, yet, 
no positive outcomes are apparent.   Today, another review is being undertaken by a Joint 
Congressional Labor Commission.
Legalism has two major outcomes. The first is that a large number of cases are 
filed, instead of being resolved bilaterally, causing delays. The second is that given the 
long delays, the development of collaborative industrial relations is very difficult as the 
parties’ positions tend to become more entrenched and often bitter as they wait for third 
party dispute resolution. 
A recent analysis by a former undersecretary for labor suggests the following 
central causes of the lack of trust and collaboration in industrial relations. From the 
employers side, it is the basic belief that union actions should be controlled, militant 
unions must be decertified, and strikes should be stopped through the use of labor 
injunctions and court orders. There is a basic unwillingness to confront and deal with 
grievances and management actions that cause labor problems.  Further, given the 
potential for multiple union membership, management appears to pit one union against 
the other, particularly in union representation elections. Often, top management becomes 
aware of problems only when they have reached a critical level, and then they are faced 
with the issue of trying to reaffirm middle management decision making. Thus, in some 
17
sense, the major failure of Filipino management is their unwillingness (in general) to 
make the effort to create long-term collaborative industrial relations. We must note 
however, that recent efforts to establish labor-management councils in firms represents 
some change in management thinking about labor-management collaboration in the 
Philippines (see below). 
DATA AND METHODS
Our method in this paper is to analyze changing employment relations in the 
Philippines through the study of practices in different firms and sectors. Accordingly, we 
conducted field research, using interviews with managers and union leaders, participant
observation,  and examination of company level documents, in the Philippines in 1998. 
The industries and workplaces were selected for four different reasons. First, we 
wanted to study industries that were exposed to international competition.  Second, it was 
important that these industries be significant players in the national economy. Third, we 
wanted to have industries from both manufacturing and services, and finally we hoped to 
get a mix of foreign and domestically owned firms. The last condition was more difficult 
to meet, particularly in the Philippines, because the internationalization of some 
industries (e.g. automobiles) has almost completely erased domestic firms from the 
landscape.  Two to three lead firms were selected in key industries and studied in detail.  
The industries covered included consumer appliances, automobiles, banking, electronics 
manufacturing, petroleum refining and distribution, and sugar. 
18
Several caveats regarding the data should be noted.  First, it does not purport to be 
a representative sample.  Rather, the data indicate employment relations changes in lead 
firms in significant industries.  Our argument here is that the changes in lead firms are an 
indication of the future movement in employment relations.  The firms we researched had 
certain distinguishing characteristics.  They tended to be larger, higher paying, more law-
abiding companies, and more highly unionized than the average company in the country. 
Another noteworthy point is that the research was conducted in the immediate aftermath 
of the Asian economic crisis. Although this reflects a particular episode, it may 
accentuate temporary differences in economic contexts. 
RESULTS OF CASE STUDIES: SALIENT CURRENT EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS ISSUES
In this section, we go into depth on the two most important recent developments 
in employment relations in the Philippines: the diffusion of innovative IR/HR practices 
and the development of a core-periphery system of workforce management
Ofreneo and Ortiz (1998) found, and our research supports, two main trends in  
employment relations in the Philippines. In the smaller minority of cases, there is a clear 
movement toward accepting the concept of functional flexibility, which includes a bundle 
of high commitment human resource practices; yet, the majority of Philippine industry is 
focused on numerical flexibility, reducing full-time headcount through layoffs, 
retrenchments, subcontracting, labor only contracting, and  casualization, and engaging in 
union avoidance.   
19
The evidence from the six industry and sixteen firm cases we studied tends to show two 
main approaches to functional flexibility (the findings from the case studies are summarized 
in Table 8 and are presented in more detail in the appendix). On the one hand is the model 
where HR practices from multinational corporations are transplanted directly  into the local 
firms. The American companies in the electronics industry are good examples of this, as 
both Motorola and Intel have managed to introduce American-style HR practices. However, 
the electronics industry all over Asia has had a strong history of benchmarking with leading 
firms and, as such, their HR practices tend to be rather similar, as long as the technology 
used is similar. 
-- INSERT TABLE 8 HERE –
The other example is a more “global” strategy where there is a mix of foreign and 
domestic practices. We can see this in the Japanese-owned automobile industry, in 
particular. For instance, while Toyota has introduced its HR practices in the Philippines, 
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines tends to have developed more localized IR and HR 
practices.  Both, however, have their fair share of labor disputes elevated not only to the 
Office of the Secretary of Labor but also  to the higher courts.
There is also a pressure to shift from traditional paternalism to more professional 
management; here benchmarking is not with multinational corporations but with any 
professional management.   
One additional recent initiative that shows some progress is the gradually 
increasing adoption of labor-management councils, resembling European works councils, 
20
introduced by employers with government encouragement but with limited union 
acceptance (Gatchalian, 2000). Although it has become fashionable to have a labor-
management council (and all the companies that we studied have one in force), there has 
been until now no systematic evaluation regarding whether they are effective in 
promoting collaboration.  In most of the cases, the subjects for discussion at the councils 
are those that the collective bargaining agreement is silent on, and tend to focus on non-
controversial issues such as worker welfare, rather than bargainable issues. 
Thus, the first major trend is towards functional flexibility and the introduction of 
new and modern types of human resource practices, such as teamwork, multiskilling, 
flexible compensation and more cooperative labor-management relations (see Aganon 
1995; Amante 1997; Ofreneo and Ortiz 1998; and PMAP 1995). In particular, methods to 
improve labor-management relations, and in non-union companies, employee relations, 
through communication and labor-management councils, are the norm in this group of 
companies and industries.6
The second major trend has involves restructuring toward increased numerical 
flexibility, through four main channels: layoffs, casualization, increased subcontracting, 
and labor-only contracting (see Aguilar 1990; Amante 1995; Amante 2000; Barranco-
Fernando 1994-95; Ofreneo and Fernando 1994; Ofreneo and Ortiz 1998; and Windell 
and Standing 1991). This restructuring helps to explain the overall GDP growth, 
particularly in manufacturing, despite the minimal growth of employment in 
manufacturing (see Tables 1 and 2, above).
6
 It is important to note that another side to this is the policy of union avoidance, as companies are using the 
old-fashioned strategy of using progressive human resource practices to keep union organization at bay. It is 
hard to make the claim that any one approach dominates. In general, the nature of the industry, and the 
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With regards to casualization, a growing number of IR/HR managers are now 
conscious of the fact that they can easily divide the work force into two — the skilled, 
technical, managerial and professional staff whose loyalty the company wants to develop 
and who are the object of various training and other human resource development 
investments of the company, and the semi-skilled and unskilled work force, whose tenure 
can be kept casual and whose performance can be controlled through the further 
segmentation of the work process.  
Under Philippine laws, a  probationary worker can  be regularized once he or she 
completes six months of work.  A casual worker, on other hand, is defined as an 
employee hired to do work that is not regular and necessary for the business, meaning 
tangential or odd types of work such as messengerial service.  However, a casual worker 
can apply for regularization once he or she has rendered a year of service, even if the year 
is broken.   
In practice, however, many companies simply hire casual or contractual workers 
only for six months and do not bother to make any distinction over whether the work 
being done is regular or non-regular.   This is also true in the case of workers under labor 
contracting arrangements, a practice which has been the subject of acrimonious union-
employer debates in the various tripartite forums during the regional economic crisis. And 
many companies avoid legal problems through the recruitment of “trainees” who are not 
deemed to be regular, but in fact, work for long periods. 
Thus, there is a clear trend toward the creation of a core and periphery divide in 
the workforce. The core workers are those who have permanent employment, are the 
competitive strategy of the firm make the biggest differences.
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recipients of training and other investments in human resource development, and who are 
being upskilled continuously. The periphery is increasing, however, and casualization 
takes several forms: hiring workers through agencies, direct hiring of casuals, and 
maintaining the work force as probationaries or temporaries for as long as possible.  
Some companies also subcontract work that was traditionally done inside the company.  
In the process of increasing casualization and subcontracting, there are many instances 
where there are violations of existing labor law (Aguilar 1990).  Most importantly, the 
absence of  legislative support for this growing pool of workers is a significant issue.
THE ROLE OF UNIONS, IR INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT 
Our case studies indicated that the focus of employment relations adjustments 
includes two broad types, functional flexibility and numerical flexibility. Industries using 
higher levels of skills and technology emphasize functional flexibility. These can be seen 
in particular in the electronics, auto and appliance industries. There is also the gradual 
beginning of a movement towards functional flexibility in banking and even in the sector 
of the garments industry focusing on quality markets. However, in most other industries, 
the overwhelming focus is on numerical flexibility. 
In the view of the World Bank, it is important that appropriate policies and 
institutions be in place to mitigate against the negative impact of industrial restructuring 
and structural adjustment (World Bank 1993, 1995; see discussion below).  In some 
economies, there are institutions (such as unions and government policies) that act as 
countervailing forces to the actions of capital.  In this section, we explore the question of 
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why these institutions have either not been present or not been very effective in the 
Philippines.
UNIONS AND IR INSTITUTIONS
An already weak union movement is being further weakened as a consequence of 
employer emphases on numerical flexibility. Our case studies and accumulated evidence 
from various other papers show a pattern of pervasive union avoidance in the most 
globalized sector of the Philippines, the electronics industry (Bitonio 2000; Lainez, 
Lerma, and Ofreneo 1994).  This is true for electronics companies located in both the 
privately-managed regular industrial zones as well as in the government-run export 
processing zones. Union avoidance can be both covert and overt.  In the first case, it 
entails the use of proactive IR/HR measures such as establishment of a grievance 
machinery, maintaining a functioning labor-management council, conducting team 
building exercises, keeping lines of communication open, and so on.
The overt  anti-union strategies include the firing of union activists,  refusal to 
bargain, threatening employees with dire consequences if they join the union, forcing 
decertification, and so on.  In the export processing zones, there is a de facto informal 
non-union policy enforced by regional governors and zone administrators, as having a 
union-free workforce is seen as a major draw in attracting foreign investment.7
7
 There are about 35 export processing zones in the Philippines. Some of these export processing zones are 
administered by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (state-owned), while others are special export 
processing zones managed privately. The contribution of export processing zones to exports is large, and 
growing, from 4.6% in 1984 to 25% in 1996.  The prevalent method of avoiding unionization is through 
selective hiring and employer/government intimidation of unions.  Clearly, what motivates these policies is 
the justification of economic development. And most often, zone administrators view unions as significant 
deterrents to the attraction of foreign investors.
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The economic crisis has acted as an important lever in reducing the militancy of unions at 
the industry or firm level, as it has created a climate where unions see the movement to cut 
costs as inevitable. There have been two types of effects here. On the one hand, it has driven 
unions to be more acquiescent in their approach to workforce reduction. This has also 
coincided with employer initiatives in some sectors and firms to develop more collaborative 
labor- management relations. Note the historically low level of strikes, even during the 
economic crisis (Table 9).  On the other hand, it has made many unions and workers bitter 
about the companies, resulting in a few highly contentious and visible strikes, such as the 
actions of the unions at Philippine Airlines in 1998 over job security (Ofreneo, 2000). 
-- INSERT TABLE 9 HERE –
Since the l997 Asian economic crisis, the most strike-prone industries were the 
transport industry, utilities and the hotel industry – industries where investors, unlike in 
light manufacturing, can pack up and seek investment areas elsewhere in Asia.   
However, even in these industries where past strikes were usually settled in favor of the 
workers, the trend is not in favor of the unions.  More and more, employers are willing to 
slug it out with the unions and shut down operations, temporarily or permanently, if 
necessary, as what happened in the case of Philippine Air Lines and more recently, the 
private operator of the Light Railway Transit.   
In manufacturing, the situation is even more dire for unions.   Not only were there 
numerous cases in the past of companies closing down operations permanently in 
response to strikes, e.g, Mattel, but also there are companies that are not facing any labor 
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disputes or even financial losses which have decided to phase out manufacturing 
operations in the Philippines in favor of relocation in even cheaper industrial sites in 
Indonesia, Thailand, China and other countries.  Most of the multinational companies 
which closed down their Philippine manufacturing plants in early l999 had collective 
bargaining agreements with a moderate labor organization, the Federation of Free 
Workers (FFW). 
Overall, the economic crisis has proved to be an important vehicle to accelerate 
the movement towards restructuring for either functional or numerical flexibility.  In 
many cases, the financial crisis has modified union positions in bargaining, and forced 
compromise in areas where compromise was not forthcoming earlier (see Erickson and 
Kuruvilla 2000; Esguerra et al. 1999; Legardo and Ortiz 2000).
This has all come at a time of political change where unions are losing their 
political influence. Weak in terms of density, Philippine unions have arguably had 
considerable political influence; for example, Philippine unions were an important part of 
the opposition to President Ramos’ attempt at constitutional change in 1997 to allow him 
to serve another term (Ranald, 1999). However, with the inability to show a united front 
and the loss of labor friendly congressmen and senators in recent elections, the ability of 
unions to push through reforms favoring their position (such as the abolition of labor only 
contracting) is seriously affected. The left-wing unions in particular have been weakened 
by political disagreements and splits since 1993.
The fractured nature of the labor movement and the inability to merge is also a 
critical problem. Although mergers would be one way to presenting a united front, 
personality and ideological differences apparently stand in the way. However, Philippine 
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unions have recently attempted to form broader alliances with other social movements 
and beyond the borders of the Philippines, for example in the Manila People’s Forum in 
1996 which ran in parallel to the APEC Forum (Ranald, 1999).   A more recent 
development is the formation of the Labor Solidarity Movement (LSM), which unites 
both the moderate TUCP and the Federation of Free Workers with breakaway groups 
from the KMU and some socialist-leaning but independent labor organizations.   LSM 
enjoys the support of both the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) of AFL-CIO.
Unions have also made some recent advances in organizing in the export-
processing zones.  By the end of 1999, there were 158 unions operating in the export 
processing zones, with 13,595 members, or 5.5% of the 247,076 workers employed in the 
zones. 23% of the unions act as bargaining agents, covering about 80% of the union 
members and 4% of the total workers in the zones. (Bureau of Labor Relations 2001).
Another silver lining for trade unions is the fact that competitiveness does not 
depend solely on the ability of the corporation to have a flexible labor force and the 
ability of the organization to right-size; it also depends on the degree of cooperation and 
support given by a motivated work force to competitive and productivity programs being 
initiated by the corporations.    This observation is reinforced by the findings of the World 
Competitiveness Report for l998 and l999, which show that the Philippines vis-à-vis other 
Asian countries enjoys an advantage in skilled labor but none in semi-skilled labor. This 
clearly  provides the unions a major bargaining chip, specifically in having a voice on 
modernization plans, sharing of benefits, etc.  But to be able to exploit such an 
opportunity, the unions must by necessity also upgrade themselves.
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There have been, in some companies, some gains for labor unions in terms of 
voice over decision making, and in the wake of the economic crisis, there have been some 
gains in voice at the national level as well, with the introduction of a tripartite social pact 
(see below). What is absent is a grand strategy on the part of trade unions, and the grand 
strategy is absent largely because the labor movement continues to be divided and 
fragmented. Although there is little talk of union mergers, there is some talk about 
coordination between different labor groups, often on an issue by issue basis.
In sum,  the labor movement is small and, therefore, weak in terms of collective 
bargaining. Second, the fragmentation of unions is extreme, and competition among 
unions continues to make the labor movement weak. The fact that bargaining 
representation is subject to elections every five years leads to a lot of union raiding across 
and within industries, and thus unions spend their energies vying for existing membership 
rather than organizing new members (Anonuevo, 2000). Third, absent the ability to 
expand collective bargaining beyond these small numbers, the ability of unions to 
significantly voice the concerns of labor in the economic development process is 
seriously compromised. The inability of unions to resolve jurisdictional problems and 
come together to cooperate also implies another outcome, i.e., the limited ability to focus 
on the development of solid solidarity work or collaboration.  
Finally, the ability of unions to counteract the adverse impacts of restructuring are 
also limited by the nature of Philippine IR institutions, in particular the fact of no formal 
centralized bargaining and the use of minimum wages as the basis for pattern bargaining.
GOVERNMENT POLICY
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It is the government whose response to the changes in employment relations has 
been the slowest and most unsure. One the one hand, the government has promoted the 
skills development system through extensive reorganization of existing skills 
development institutions. One government agency, the Department of Trade and Industry 
- Center for Industrial Competitiveness (DTI-CIC) has attempted to foster the growth of 
labor management collaboration through encouragement of labor-management councils.  
Yet, the weakness in the government’s response is in the area of protection of union and 
worker rights, in enforcement of the law, and in ensuring that contract, casual, and 
temporary workers interests are properly protected. 
If unions are seen as a bulwark against worker exploitation and subcontracting, 
then it is clear that government should do more to make the process of union formation 
and maintenance easier.  Even more important than the process of union formation has 
been in the weakness of public policy in curbing overt and covert anti-union and union 
avoidance strategies, which as in the United States, is illegal yet widespread. The 
willingness of the government to overlook clear violations of labor law in several areas, 
and the inability of the Department of Labor to adequately police workplaces especially 
where unions are absent, constitute government failure. Much has been written about the 
various labor law changes that are required in the Philippines (e.g. Gonzalo and Sanchez 
1998; Ofreneo and Azucena 1999).  
With respect to the economic crisis, the Employers Confederation of the 
Philippines (ECOP) and the government have managed to orchestrate a tripartite forum to 
discuss the adjustment to the crisis (see Ofreneo, 2000). A social accord on industrial 
harmony and stability was signed between the employer’s confederation of the 
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Philippines and the major trade union federations that sought to encourage mutual 
restraint on layoffs and industrial disputes in February 1998.   Although  difficult to 
quantify, the accord has helped ease the tensions engendered by the crisis and has become 
a vehicle for educating employers on how to humanize the process of adjustment to the 
crisis. The Department of Labor has organized conferences that have resulted in regional 
social accords, while ECOP succeeded in bringing the accord to the industrial zones. 
However, absent a more formal government intervention, it is unlikely that these accords 
will have teeth. 
The biggest challenge to the government, however, is how it can arrest the 
continuing stagnation of the industrial sector while protecting the welfare of workers.  A 
central and unresolved historical question is: what was different about the Philippines; 
why did the export-oriented industrialization strategy fail to provide rapid development 
for the country and substantial improvements in standards of living for workers?  And, 
why did the Philippines fail to move through different stages of export-oriented 
industrialization, especially from the stage where low wages are the major source of 
advantage to the stage where low wages become less relevant in their strategy?  After all, 
other East and Southeast Asian nations, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, 
benefited to a greater extent from export-oriented industrialization strategies (Gereffi 
1996).  And, standard international trade theory, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
suggests that labor-abundant countries specializing in labor-intensive products should see
a benefit to labor from engagement in trade (Krugman and  Obstfeld 1987). 
We argue that one key reason that the export-oriented industrialization strategy 
did not contribute to greater growth of the Philippine economy compared to some of its 
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neighbors is that the government did not play as effective a role in facilitating both 
domestic and foreign direct investment, particularly as regards the development of 
physical and human-capital infrastructure, but also in terms of changing the incentives to 
attract differing types of foreign investment (Aldaba 1994; Medalla 1998).8 And, for 
whatever reasons, the Philippines has remained a labor-surplus economy, with resulting 
adverse impacts for labor’s bargaining power and for the government’s incentives to 
invest in (and provide multinationals incentives to invest in) skills development (Ofreneo, 
Amante, Ortiz 1998).  
Thus, the combination of the ongoing labor surplus and historical lack of 
government focus on infrastructure improvement and skills development favored 
continued emphasis on the low wage development strategy.  But, as even lower wage 
countries open up to the global economy (e.g. China, Vietnam, Indonesia), this strategy 
becomes even less viable.  The unfortunate outcome is that the Philippines has so far 
missed out on the high-skill export-oriented approach taken by Singapore and Malaysia, 
while at the same time it is losing its low wage advantage.  
Turning this situation around requires a serious re-thinking of the existing but 
failed policy of simply liberalizing the economy without undertaking needed institutional 
and infrastructural reform programs (e.g., bureaucratic reform, skills development, 
physical infrastructure improvement, improving corporate and government transparency, 
entrepreneurship development, etc.).  The government could also more seriously engage 
8
 In Singapore, for example, the government has provided incentives for high-tech foreign direct investment 
through subsidizing company-provided training and giving the companies exclusive access to the trainees, 
thereby building up general workforce skills by linking foreign direct investment and skills development 
(Kuruvilla, Erickson, and Ng 2001).  Of course, conditions are very different in the Philippines, which is 
much larger and has a different history and form of democracy from Singapore.  But, Singapore does 
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in proactive strategizing on how the Philippines can really emerge as an industrial winner 
given the state of competition in Asia and the rest of the world.
CONCLUSIONS
The effects of increased international competition on employment relations in the 
Philippines can be seen in two main trends. In a few cases, there is development of 
functional flexibility, or  high commitment human resource practices.  But the majority of 
Philippine industry is focused on numerical flexibility, reducing headcount through 
layoffs, retrenchments, subcontracting, labor only contracting, and casualization; this has 
severely affected the labor movement and the plight of many individual workers.
These two broad trends support the Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2000), Frenkel and 
Royale (1997), Kuruvilla (1996), and Kuruvilla and Erickson (2001) hypotheses about the 
effects of international product market competition on employment relations: that it 
induces companies and firms to adopt strategies to emphasize their competitiveness, and 
these strategies may be “high road” strategies (such as the movement to functional 
flexibility) or  “low road” strategies (such as the emphasis on casualization, 
subcontracting, and other methods of attaining numerical flexibility).
The Philippines lacks a strong labor movement or effective government policies 
to counteract these trends.  The most critical problem areas that require urgent attention 
are in the areas of labor management cooperation (and the whole issue of reducing 
legalism in industrial relations), the issue of protecting workers rights during adjustment, 
and, in particular, developing the skills formation system so that it can be more effective. 
provide an example of successful government policy to upskill the workforce and attract high-tech foreign 
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We do see some developments that are a counter to the argument posed above. Although 
union coverage has dropped substantially, and union militancy has also declined in the 
1990s, there is some indication that there is increased cooperation and coordination 
among labor unions, as well as successful attempts to organize the workers in the 
burgeoning (and mainly non-union) export processing zones.   Another positive sign is 
the renewed interest towards tripartism (which waned in the l980s) and the development 
of cooperative structures, particularly labor-management councils, which are actively 
encouraged by the government. However, these are small steps, not giant leaps, and by 
themselves, we argue, do not mitigate fully against the impact of the drive for numerical 
flexibility.
We also want to briefly relate our findings to contemporary debates about 
economic integration and employment relations generally. There is an increasingly large 
literature on the impact of economic integration on employment relations worldwide. 
Those with a more positive view tend to highlight the economic growth that comes with 
integration into the world economy. The World Bank, for instance, touts the higher 
economic growth rates and also makes an argument that economic openness tends to 
reduce poverty and inequalities both within and across countries (World Bank 2000a and 
2000b). On the other hand, critics argue that unregulated markets have detrimental 
impacts on workers, inequality, and the environment, and call for some form of regulation 
(Greider 1997; Martin and Schuman 1996). The World Bank response is that, where 
appropriate public policies are in place, the costs of structural adjustment and 
environmental degradation can be minimized (World Bank 1993, 1995).  In essence, we 
investment, a strategy that has been followed to some extent by Malaysia as well.
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find that those public policies are not in place in the employment relations arena in the 
Philippines.  Thus, the Philippines is an important case for developing nations in that it 
highlights the potentially negative impacts of economic integration on employment 
relations and workers generally in the absence of countervailing policies and institutions. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY STUDIES
The Consumer Appliances Industry:  
This industry is extremely hard hit by global integration, largely through the 
influence of the Montreal protocol on global warming which forces countries to desist 
from using freon in refrigerators. This industry is also hit by market integration in terms 
of   cost pressures, as refrigerators made in neighboring countries are much cheaper. The 
Asian economic crisis has only accelerated the moves made by Philacor to restructure its 
operations. The focus of restructuring is the attainment of functional flexibility, largely 
however, through greenfield operations.  As such, Philacor has been able to introduce a 
host of human resource innovations consistent with the attainment of functional 
flexibility, including benchmarking their HR programs with the best in the world.  The 
economic crisis has only helped Philacor to restructure operations, through increased 
union acceptance of “market realities.” There is little evidence that the company is 
beginning to pursue collaborative labor management relations, however.  
Moreover, the general strategic response of the company to global competition is 
through modernization.  With a new state-of-the-art facility, Philacor had no choice but to 
reduce its work force drastically.
The Banking Industry
The changes in the banking industry is a little more diffuse, and are related more 
to the liberalization of the industry following deregulation in 1993-1994, which allowed  
big universal banks to enter all aspects of the financial business, particularly rural credit. 
The pressures here have been mostly competitive pressures from within the industry, 
35
particularly with the entry of foreign banks. However, the pace of reform in the banks that 
we have studied was extremely slow. In particular, the PNB, the bank that was privatized, 
as well as the Far East Bank were  only beginning to attempt to reform HR practices. In 
both cases, they were using the foreign banks’ HR practices as a benchmark. In no way 
can it be said that competitive HR practices have been introduced in this industry.  
However, the reform efforts have only recently begun. In many ways, the reform in this 
sector is similar to that of the banking sectors in both India and Malaysia. 
PNB emerged in l999 as the bank with the highest  non-performing loans (NPLs), 
about twice the rate of the average Philippine commercial bank.   Lucio Tan, a friend of 
the Estrada Administration and owner of PAL and Allied Bank, is now the majority 
owner of PNB.   Employees are still guessing what kind of IR/HR changes will be made 
by the new owner.
In the case of the FEB, the bank was merged with the Bank of the Philippines 
Islands (BPI), one of the  country’s largest banks.  BPI is known for maintaining a 
multiplicity of unions by concluding collective bargaining agreements with different 
unions in different branches instead of dealing with one union representing rank-and-file 
employees bank-wide, as is the norm in other banks.
The Automobile industry 
The automobile industry is Japanese dominated. The impact of market integration, 
therefore, is seen in the regional production plans of Japanese companies. IR and HR 
systems meet regional Japanese standards, and follow Japanese methods of production 
organization and workforce management. However, there are some important differences 
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across companies. Whereas Toyota has managed to put in place the Toyota system 
without trade unions, Mitsubishi has a trade union, with which relations have not always 
been good. Although labor-management relations have improved in recent years, the 
economic crisis has strained relations further. Both companies have introduced state of 
the art HR practices (state of the art in Southeast Asia),  but in Toyota, this has amounted 
to a complete transplantation of the Toyota system, while MMPC has just introduced or is 
beginning to introduce competitive practices. The impact of economic integration on 
local producers has been devastating. Francisco Motors, hit by increased international 
competition, has seen its markets erode and is on the verge of closure. Further, its 
paternalistic management style is seriously threatened. 
The Asian economic crisis has severely hit the automobile industry in terms of 
reduced demand, and all companies have had to accept workforce reductions. Toyota has 
been more reluctant to layoff people than has MMPC. Toyota’s practices during this 
period of the financial crisis have set the standard that the industry aims to reach, but not 
all companies have invested in human resource development the way Toyota has, so, 
logically, Toyota stands to lose more by layoffs than its competitors.    
However, by the year 2003, tariffs for the car industry will be down to five (5) per 
cent.   It is well known the Philippine car assembly industry developed mainly behind the 
high tariff walls erected in the l960s, which at one time was fixed as high as 200 per cent.  
Today, with tariffs at 20 per cent, more and more completely-built up units are entering 
the Philippine market.  Thus, both  Toyota and Mitsubishi are presently weighing  in the 
financial viability of maintaining their assembly plants or shifting to the import-and-
distribute business strategy as what Johnson and Johnson and company did in l999.
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The Electronics Industry
This industry has been globalized since its inception, as it is almost completely 
export oriented. And  the industry is heavily dependent on the demand for 
semiconductors. Thus, slowdowns in world wide demand for semiconductors have 
affected this industry since 1994-1995. The human resource systems in this industry are 
benchmarked to the best practices across the world wide electronics industry, and thus a 
Motorola factory in the Philippines has  pretty much the same IR and HR principles and 
practices to a Motorola factory anywhere else in the world. One unique characteristic of 
this industry is the focus on non union operations, and all three firms surveyed here have 
followed vigorous anti-union policies. The case studies also highlight the differences 
between high cost and low cost producers, with low cost producers tending to follow 
more numerical flexibility strategies (e.g., UNIDEN), while high cost producers tend to 
focus more on functional flexibility. 
The Petroleum Products Industry
Market integration per se has not had much of an impact on this industry other 
than in terms of changes in oil prices.  However, deregulation (in terms of the price of 
gasoline) has been the major impetus towards economic restructuring. We were able to 
study the market leader, PETRON. An added complication was the privatization of  
PETRON in 1994. Thus, the major efforts at restructuring industrial relations and human 
resources in PETRON has more to do with privatization than anything else. And, as our 
case suggests, this process has only recently begun. 
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At CALTEX, there is an effort to introduce a productivity-based pay scheme 
called Salary Administration, which is a combination of union-negotiated across-the-
board wage increases and merit-based pay increases.
The Sugar Industry
While we primarily examined the sugar refining part of the industry, what is clear 
is that the competitiveness of this industry internationally has less to do with the refining 
process, but considerably more to do with sugar cultivation. Thus, this industry is one 
example where market integration must inevitably lead to some form of land reform such 
that the size of holdings can be increased to enable more efficient farming to raise yields. 
The Philippine yield per hectare is lower than any major sugar grower in the world. And, 
the supply of sugar is controlled by the government, in that the government restricts the 
amount of sugar that is imported. Both internationalization and regionalization will affect 
the government’s  ability to continue control of supply, and hence, this is a serious issue 
for further study and action. In terms of HR practices the sugar refining industry is only 
recently being modernized. 
Internationalization, however, is changing the production patterns in the industry.   
In the past, the industry was highly dependent on the farming-milling nexus, with sugar 
mills usually built around  huge tracts of land called haciendas and tilled, during harvest 
and planting seasons, by migrant sacadas who were poorly paid.   Today, under economic 
liberalization, millers can source their raw sugar from more efficient sugar producers like 
Australia or cheaper sources such as Thailand.
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Table 1.
Average Annual Growth Rates of GNP and GDP,  1946-96
Year GNP GDP
1946-50 17.2   16.5 
1951-55  9.3 7.9 
1956-60 5.0 4.6 
1961-65 5.5 4.7
1966-70 4.8 4.9 
1971-75 6.5 5.2 
1976-80 6.3 4.5 
1981-85 -1.7    -1.1 
1986-90 5.4 4.7 
1991-95 2.9 2.2 
1995-96 7.2 5.8  
Source: NEDA statistical compilations.
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Table 2:  Unemployment Rate, Labor Costs, and Wages
Year Unemployment Labor Costs-          Real Wage Index               
Rate Manufacturing          Manufacturing                  
(Pesos/Employee/Day)               (1980=100)
1970 5.3%a 4332b           N/A  
1975 4.4% 4240             97c
1980 4.8% 10918           100                                        
1985 6.1% 24804             72                         
1986 6.4% 27828             82                                         
1987 9.1% 32556             95                                         
1988 8.3% 37643           108                                         
1989 8.4% 43163           110                                         
1990 8.1% 51304           108                                         
1991 9.0% 60495             99                                        
1992 8.6% 67461           107                                          
1993 8.9% 70325             97                                          
1994 8.4% 78850           114                                            
1995 8.4% N/A           122                   
1996 7.4% N/A          N/A                                            
1997 7.9% N/A          N/A                                            
1998 9.6% N/A          N/A                                            
1999 9.7% N/A          N/A                                            
Sources: Integrated Survey of Households (ISH), Employment, Hours and Earnings Survey (EHES), , Asian 
Development Bank, Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics
Notes:
a
  1971
b
  1973
c
   1978
45
Table 3:  Unions and Collective Bargaining Coverage
INDICATOR 1996 1997 1998 1999
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Unions Registered/Restored       410      342 330 335
  Federations/Labor Centers           4          2 1 -
  Private Sector Unions       371      305 268 272
  Public Sector Unions        35        35 61 63
Membership of Newly 
Registered Unions
 32,738 28,671 34,919 29403
  Federations/Labor Centers           a          a 649 -
  Private Sector Unions   28,802 24,835 23,426 22763
  Public Sector Unions     3,936   3,836 10,844 6,640
Unions/Federations 
Cancelled
         22         3 3 5
Existing Unions     8,248   8,822 9,374 9,850
  Federations/Labor Centers        172      174 173 173
  Private Sector Unions     7,610   8,149 8,643 9,056
  Public Sector Unions        466      499 558 621
Existing Membership 
of
Active Unions (000)     3,611   3,635 3,687 3,731
  Private Sector Unions b     3,468   3,489 3,537 3,570
  Public Sector Unions       143      146 150 161
COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS
  CBAs Newly Filed        818      532 432 413
  Workers Covered by New 
CBAs
131,446 92,149 68,616 64703
  Expired CBAs        634      517 319 577
  Existing CBAs     3,398   2,987 3,106 2,956
  Workers Covered by 
Existing CBAs (000)
       411      426 551 529
Notes: 1. Starting 1998, data include Caraga Region.
2. Existing unions and memberships include those registered with BLR.
a   Membership of newly registered federations were already included in the membership of private sector unions.
b    Includes membership of affiliated unions.  It however excludes federation members of 2.8 million farm workers.
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Table 4
Selected labor force statistics, l998-2000
(in thousands and percentages)
Selected Variables  April l998 April l999 April 2000  
Labor force (‘000) 32,111 33,444 32,874
Class of worker: (per cent)
      Wage and salary  49.4  48.2  50.6 
      Own-account   37.2  36.6  37.4
 Unpaid family workers  13.4  15.1   12
Industry: (per cent)
Agriculture  37.5   41.0    37.3
Industrial
Mining and Quarrying   0.5     0.4      0.4
Manufacturing  10.2                 9.4      9.7
Electricity, gas & water   0.5     0.5      0.5
Construction    6.1     5.4      5.5
Services
Wholesale and retail  15.9   15.4    16.4
Transportation    6.7     6.5       7
Financing    2.4     2.4      2.6
Community  20.2   19.0    20.6
Unemployment rate 13.3   11.8    13.9
Underemployment rate 21.0   22.7    25.1
Source: National Statistics  Office.
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Table 5
Employment by Sectors in Selected Asian countries
Percentage shares, 1980, 1990, and 1998
Agriculture Industry Services
1980 1990 1998:            ’80     ’90     ’98 :    ’80 ’90  ’98
Philippines 51.7    44.5     39.2             15.5   15.9      16.4  32.9    39.5    44.4
Thailand     71.0    64.0     50.3             10.0   14.0      19.7     19.0    22.0    30.0 
Indonesia   59.0    57.0     41.2             12.0   14.0      19.0    29.0    29.0    39.8 
Malaysia    41.0    27.0     17.3             19.0   23.0      19.0    40.0    50.0    63.7
Korea (S.)  37.0    18.0      13.6            27.0   35.0      33.2    36.0    47.0    53.2
Source:  Esguerra et al., l999.
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Table 6:  Percent of Establishments Hiring Temporary/Casual Labor
For Specific Purpose, by Employment Size, 1990
Percent of Establishments Hiring Temps
Employment Limited-Duration Stop-gap Labor Alternative to
Size Projects regular workers
1-20 67.7 63.1 24.6
21-50 70.3 52.5 34.7
51-100 76.9 69.2 35.9
101-250 80.9 63.8 38.3
251-500 84.9 71.2 39.7
501-1000 78.6 57.1 42.9
1001 and above 90.3 80.6 35.5
TOTAL 77.6 63.8 36.0
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Table 7:  A Picture of the Extent of Subcontracting
1.   Percent share of establishments with subcontractors
1994: 21.0%
1995: 24.1%
2. Distribution of subcontractors
Companies: 82.0%
Individuals: 15.0%
3. Jobs contracted 
Security services: 34.4%
Maintenance/Janitorial: 22.6%
Production Process: 32.2%
4.  Subcontracting by industry
Manufacturing: 35.3%
Trade: 13.3%
Services: 13.0%
5.  Number of subcontractors/establishment
Manufacturing:  3 per firm
6.  Subcontracting by type of firm
Export oriented firms: 40.7%
Non-Export oriented firms: 21.0%
7.   Subcontracting by ownership
Foreign firms:                   43.0%
Domestic firms:             21.0%
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Table 8:  Findings from Case Studies
Consumer 
Appliances
Banking Automobiles
Industry Features Competition 
increases as 
MNCs' enter the 
market. The 
Montreal 
protocol forces 
restructuring.
Competition 
increases as a 
function of 
deregulation in 
1994
Steadily growing 
market for autos, 
and sharp 
increase in the 
players in the 
market, leading 
to intensive 
competition. 
(Number) and 
Features of 
Firms Studied
(1) Largest Firm 
with 56% market 
share that is 
declining. 
(2) Premier 
Banks, the 
largest recently 
privatized.  
(3). The oldest, 
(Mitsubishi), the 
most successful 
(Toyota), and a 
domestically 
owned firm. 
IR/HR strategy Greenfield 
Strategy
Restructuring to 
cut costs, 
redeployment
Rationalization 
and 
restructuring. 
Work 
Organization 
Changes 
Movement from 
Tayloristic to 
Team based
Movement 
towards team 
based work, 
slower in the 
erstwhile public 
sector bank. 
Mitsubishi 
follows more 
Tayloristic 
systems, while 
Toyota follows 
team based 
production 
systems 
Numerical 
Flexibility
Changes
Enhanced 
through 
intensive  
subcontracting
No Layoffs, or 
subcontracting, 
Reduction of 
headcount is key 
for all firms. 
Subcontracting 
very heavily 
used.  
Compensation 
Changes 
New systems 
tied to skills in
greenfield sites
Focus on higher 
compensation 
given high labor 
turnover of 
skilled clericals. 
Toyota system 
links wages to 
skills, but other 
plants do not 
link. Gradual 
move towards 
bonuses
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Labor Relations
Changes
Introduction of 
labor-
management 
council, some 
conflict
Private bank is 
aggressively 
nonunion, while 
erstwhile public 
bank has strong 
union that 
follows industry 
pattern. 
Privatization has 
provided union 
rights to bargain 
independently.  
Toyota is non 
union and 
aggressively so. 
Mitsubishi is 
unionized and 
relations with 
union gradually 
improving 
through the 
introduction of a 
labor 
management 
council.  
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Table 8:  Findings from Case Studies  (continued)
Electronics Petroleum 
Products
Sugar
Industry Features Steady growth, 
Foreign 
dominated, 
largest exporter 
of the 
Philippines. 
Deregulated 
industry, stable 
markets, but 
unstable raw 
material costs 
(oil prices). 
Domestic market 
focus, industry 
characterized by 
low yields and 
low productivity, 
ravaged by El 
Nino.  
(Number) and 
Features of 
Firms Studied
(3) High end 
firm which is 
“best company 
to work for,” and 
two other firms. 
(1) The largest 
oil firm in the 
Philippines, has 
been recently 
privatized. 
(1) Largest 
refiner of sugar, 
but cost of 
production 
higher than 
imported sugar. 
IR/HR strategy Non union high 
performance 
workplace 
practice at high 
end firms.
Major 
organizational 
and work 
restructuring. 
Restructuring to 
cut refining costs
Work 
Organization 
Changes 
Autonomous 
teams at high 
end, Tayloristic 
at low end,
Continuous 
process industry
Continuous 
process industry, 
multiskilling 
common, 
reducing job 
classifications.  
Numerical 
Flexibility
Changes
No layoffs at 
high end, use of 
trainees and 
subcontracting at 
low end. 
Subcontracting 
begins in the 
1990s. 
Subcontracting
Compensation 
Changes 
Linked to skill 
acquisition at 
high end, but at 
minimum wage 
level at low end. 
Market Leader in 
compensation, 
recent 
introduction of 
pay for 
performance. 
Compensation 
tied to training 
and behavioral 
programs. 
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Labor Relations
Changes
Completely and 
aggressively non 
union. 
Amicable labor 
relations with 
three company 
unions, and one 
clerical staff 
union affiliated 
to national 
union. 
Cordial labor 
relations through 
labor 
management 
councils. 
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Table 9:  Strikes and Lockouts
Year Strikes/
Lockouts
1970 104
1976   91
1980   62
1985 371
1986 581
1987 436
1988 267
1989 197
1990 183
1991 182
1992 136
1993 122
1994   93
1995   94
1996   89
1997   93
1998   92
1999   58
Source: National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
